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Abstract
In the theoretical literature, strong arguments have been provided
in support of the efficiency defense in antitrust merger policy.
One of the most often cited results is due to Williamson (1968)
that shows how relatively small reduction in cost could offset the
deadweight loss of a large price increase. Furthermore, Salant et
al. (1983) demonstrate that (not for monopoly) mergers are un-
profitable absent efficiency gains. The general result, drawn in a
Cournot framework by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), is that (not too
large) mergers that are profitable are always welfare improving.
In the present work we challenge the conclusions of this literature
in two aspects. First, we show that Williamson’s results under-
estimate the welfare loss due to a price-increasing merger and
overestimate the effect of efficiency gains. Using the simple linear
Cournot model, we show that efficiency gains needed to compen-
sate for the deadweight loss are much larger than Williamson’s.
Then, we prove that the conditions for welfare improving merg-
ers defined by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) hold true only when
consumers are adversely affected. This seems an argument to dis-
regard their policy prescriptions when antitrust authorities are
more ”consumers-oriented”. In this respect, we provide a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for a consumer surplus improving
merger: in a two firm merger, efficiency gains must be larger than
the pre-merger average markup.
Keywords: Mergers; Efficiency Gains; Cournot oligopoly
JEL Classification: D43, L11, L22.
1Dipartimento di Economia, Universita` di Salerno, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084
1 Introduction
The purpose of the present work is to analyze the role of efficiency gains
in horizontal mergers, to evaluate the effect on welfare and to critically
review the main contribution in the literature on this topic.
Mergers represent a major economic issue in the economic literature
as well as for antitrust policy. To provide an idea of the numbers and
resource involved, over the period 1981-1998, there were nearly 70,000
merger announcements worldwide, with each deal worth at least 1 mil-
lion U.S. dollars, of which nearly 45,000 were actually implemented. The
average deal was valued at 220 million U.S. dollars (base year 1995). Of
these, 42% were horizontal mergers, defined as those involving two com-
panies with sales in the same 4-digit industry, 54% were conglomerate
mergers, and 4% were vertical mergers.1
As pointed out by Schmalensee (1989), mergers have also been an im-
portant source of increase in market concentration, particularly outside
the US.
The relationship between market concentration and welfare domi-
nated the economic debate since the first wave of mergers at the end
of the nineteenth century; the common wisdom was that the higher the
concentration, the lower the welfare. This wisdom was challenged some
decades ago when new strands in economic literature questioned this
relationship.
Some works, such as Salant and Shaffer (1999), showed how higher
market concentration can imply higher welfare in a Cournot oligopoly.2
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1For this data see Gugler et al. (2003).
2At a first glance this argument seems counterintuitive but it clearly relies on
an important property of Cournot equilibrium: the more efficient firms produce
more. Indeed, assume linear costs and an initial equilibrium with n symmetric firms.
Suppose that cost are redistributed with a mean preserving increase in the variance:
total quantity, that depends only on the average marginal cost, remains unchanged.
Now more efficient firms produce more than less efficient firms. Total output is
unchanged and so is social gross surplus, but total cost are reduced. Welfare has
increased together with concentration.
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In other works strong arguments were provided in support of the effi-
ciency defense in antitrust merger policy. One of the results most often
cited was provided by Williamson (1968) that showed how relatively
small reduction in cost, even in a merger for monopoly, could offset the
deadweight loss of a large price increase.
The theoretical literature on horizontal mergers largely relies on the
standard Cournot model. A central postulate is that the pre-merger
and the post-merger situations are represented as Cournot equilibrium
points involving different market structures, with the merged entity be-
ing treated as a single player in the post-merger situation. An important
result in this framework was provided by Salant et al. (1983). Using
the simple linear demand and cost setting, they showed that mergers
without cost savings are unprofitable unless they involve more than 80%
of the market. Even if Davidson and Deneckere (1984) showed in the
Bertrand setting with differentiated products, that every merger is prof-
itable, the result in Cournot competition had some implications.3 One
of these implications was that socially inefficient mergers are unprof-
itable as long as they are not merger for monopoly. Some subsequent
works, such as Perry and Porter (1985), challenged this point of view
suggesting that anticompetitive profitable mergers are possible when
fixed asset combination is taken into account and when mergers oc-
cur in industries with increasing marginal cost in the short run.4 But
then Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provided an important result: they de-
fined conditions under which profitable mergers are welfare improving
in a general Cournot setting. Considering synergies, learning and asset
combination they are able to show that the reallocation of production to
the more efficient firms can lead to welfare improvement. Their bench-
mark work is based on the characterization of the external effect of a
merger, that is the sum of the effects on consumers and outsiders –
incumbent firms not involved in the merger.
The empirical literature on merger profitability exhibits some degree
3This difference in the results is due to complementarity and substitutability of
the choice variables and to the fact that in Bertrand competition the merger entity
continues to produce all the differentiated product of the pre-merger firms. In the
model of Salant et al. (1983), on the contrary, merger resolves in a “lock-up” of all
the merging firm but one. Perry and Porter (1985) for this argument.
4On merger profitability see also McAfee and Williams (1992). Faul´ı-Oller (1997)
shows that profitability of mergers increases with the concavity of demand function.
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of controversy, mostly of a quantitative sort. Gugler et al. (2003), in
the largest cross-national study to date, report that nearly 60% of all
the horizontal mergers were profitable. On the other hand, two other
broad-base studies concluded that the profitability of acquired firms de-
clined after the merger for U.K. firms (Meeks, 1977) and for U.S. firms
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1988), while in Mueller (1980) divergent re-
sults studying OECD countries are reported. Trying to explain this
rather mixed picture, Amir et al. (2003) modeled the effect of a merger
when non-merging firms are uncertain about the efficiency gains reached
by the merging firms. They show how the result depends not only on
the magnitude of cost reduction but also on the belief of the outsiders;
a merger can be profitable even if efficiency gains do not actually ma-
terialize, provided that non-merging firms sufficiently believe that the
merger will generate large enough cost reduction.
The contribution of this work is twofold.
First of all we challenge the common wisdom that small cost re-
ductions more than offset the deadweight loss due to a price-increasing
merger. Indeed, even though this result is due to the pioneering work
of Williamson (1968), it remains very popular in the literature. Many
works – such as Bloch (1995); Sapienza (2002); Schmalensee (2004);
Shapiro and Willig (1990); Willig et al. (1991), just to provide few ex-
amples – refer to Williamson’s result as the clearest theoretical evidence
of the importance of efficiency gains in merger analysis. In the simple
linear Cournot framework, we show that the cost reduction needed to
offset the allocative efficiency cost of a price-increasing merger are much
larger than Williamson’s. To provide an example of the magnitude of
this difference, Williamson reports that, with a demand elasticity of 1,
a reduction of just 0.5% of the average cost can offset the negative effect
on welfare of a 10% price increase. In our setting the efficiency gains
must exceed 11%. There are two main reasons for this huge difference.
First of all, in the Williamson’s analysis efficiency gains are computed
on the whole production of the industry. This is of course adequate only
when a merger for monopoly is considered. Second, he assumes a com-
petitive price in the pre-merger situation, so that the deadweight loss
is just a loss in the consumer surplus and not in profits. In the present
work we consider the case in which a merger occurs in an oligopoly in
which firms compete a` la Cournot.
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Extending the analysis to a more general Cournot setting the exter-
nal effect defined by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) is fully characterized.
We first show that the effect of a merger on consumers has always the
opposite sign to the effect on outsiders; so it is possible to show that the
condition defined by Farrell and Shapiro for a welfare-improving merger
holds only when consumers are adversely affected. The latter seems an
argument to disregard their policy prescriptions when antitrust author-
ities are concerned about consumer protection.
At this regard we provide a clearcut condition for a merger not to re-
duce consumer surplus under Cournot competition: the efficiency gains
must be larger than (m− 1) times the average pre-merger markup-to-
cost (MC) ratio, where m is the number of merging firms.
This work is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the anal-
ysis of the Williamson (1968)’s result and to the comparison with the
linear Cournot equilibrium analysis. Section 3 extends the analysis and
describes, in the linear Cournot setting, the Farrell and Shapiro (1990)’s
approach and the underlying forces that drive the result. It is shown
that the efficiency gains needed to offset the welfare loss due to the
increased market power of the merger is a proportion of the pre-merger
MC ratio that is decreasing in the number of firms. On the contrary,
it is shown that the efficiency gains needed to have a profitable merger
is a proportion of the pre-merger MC ratio that is increasing in the
number of firms. So a threshold in the market share of the merging
firms is found as a necessary and sufficient condition to have a prof-
itable merger that increases total welfare. Section 4 extends the Farrell
and Shapiro (1990)’s analysis using their marginal approach. We show
that the effect of a merger on consumers is always opposite to the ef-
fect on outsiders’ profits, and that the condition defined by Farrell and
Shapiro for a welfare-improving merger holds only when consumers are
adversely affected. Moreover a necessary and sufficient condition for
a merger not to reduce consumer surplus is provided. Section 5 con-
tains the conclusions. Most of the computations are gathered in the
Appendix.
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2 Williamson’s model compared with an equi-
librium analysis
In his pioneering work, Williamson (1968) analyzes the welfare tradeoff
of market power and efficiency motivations of mergers, and shows that
relatively small cost reductions more than offset the allocative efficiency
cost of a price increase. Assuming a market in which two or more firms
produce a homogeneous good, he analyzes the overall welfare effect of a
merger that increases the price and achieves efficiency gains. In Figure
1 his welfare analysis is depicted. If the demand is approximate to a
linear function, the deadweight loss due to the price increase is given by
1
2∆P∆Q, while the benefit from cost savings is equal to ∆ACQ. After
Figure 1: The total welfare effect of a merger, (Williamson, 1968, p.21).
some transformation, Williamson defines the condition under which the
total effect is positive; that is,
∆AC
AC
− k
2
η
(
∆P
P
)2
≥ 0 (1)
where AC is the average cost of production, η is the elasticity of the
demand in the initial equilibrium and k is a measure (P/AC) of the
5
pre-merger market power. Assuming that the initial market power is
negligible, so k = 1, expression (1) gives rise to the results in Table 1.5
η(
∆P
P
)
2 1 0.5
5% .25% .12% .06%
10% 1.00% .50% .25%
20% 4.00% 2.00% 1.00%
30% 9.00% 4.50% 2.25%
Table 1: Percentage cost reductions needed to offset some given price
increases for selected values of η.
According to his hypothesis, a merger for monopoly, that occurs
when η = 1 and that rises the price of 20%, can be welfare improving if it
achieves a reduction in cost of just 2%. Unfortunately, his formulation is
erroneous, in the sense that it overestimates the effect of cost reduction.6
After several attempts, Jackson (1970) provided the (correct) following
expression:
∆AC
AC
−
k
2η
(
∆P
P
)2
1− η∆PP
≥ 0 (2)
and numerical examples shown in Table 2.7
η(
∆P
P
)
2 1 0.5
5% .27% .13% .06%
10% 1.24% .55% .26%
20% 6.66% 2.49% 1.11%
30% 22.49% 6.42% 2.64%
Table 2: Percentage cost reductions needed to offset some given price
increases for selected values of η; Jackson (1970)’s version.
5This table is taken from Williamson (1968, p. 23).
6Indeed, the welfare effect of cost reduction is computed on the pre-merger level
of output, while it should be computed at the post-merger level, that is lower.
7Jackson (1970, p. 441).
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Results are not very different, but formulation (2) is not general,
since it works only when the price is competitive at the pre-merger
equilibrium; that is, when k = 1. Indeed, the welfare loss accounts
only for the consumer surplus loss, and not for the loss in profits on the
quantity no longer produced.8 Moreover, and most importantly, the
cost reduction in Williamson (1968) and Jackson (1970) is computed on
the whole production of the industry and not only of the merging firms.
Then, his analysis is correct just in case of a merger for monopoly when
the starting price is competitive; a situation that is at least uncommon.
Notwithstanding these limitations, Williamson’s results are still con-
sidered as the clearest evidence of the importance of efficiency gains in
merger analysis and his work is one of the most cited paper on this
topic.9
In what follows Williamson’s results are compared with an equilib-
rium analysis based on the standard Cournot model of oligopolistic
competition.
2.1 Equilibrium analysis: the linear Cournot model
Consider an industry described by a linear inverse demand P = a −
bQ and, in the pre-merger situation, n symmetric firms with constant
marginal cost c that produce a homogeneous good and compete a` la
Cournot. Assume a > c > 0 and b > 0.
The equilibrium in the pre-merger situation is described by the fol-
lowing values of total production and price,
Q∗ =
n (a− c)
b (n+ 1)
P ∗ =
a+ nc
n+ 1
of each firm’s production and profit
q∗i =
a− c
b(n+ 1)
pi∗i =
(a− c)2
b (n+ 1)2
and of consumer surplus and total welfare
CS∗ =
1
2
n2 (a− c)2
b (n+ 1)2
W ∗ =
n (n+ 2) (a− c)2
2b (n+ 1)2
8See DePrano and Nugent (1969) and Jackson (1970) on this point.
9See, for example, Bloch (1995); Sapienza (2002); Schmalensee (2004); Shapiro
and Willig (1990); Willig et al. (1991).
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Assume now that two firms merge experiencing not only an increased
market power, but also efficiency gains so that the merged entity has
marginal cost cm = c−∆c with ∆c ≥ 0.
At the new equilibrium an asymmetry between the merged entity
and the outsiders arises. As a general result in Cournot oligopoly, the
most efficient firm produces more than the others and the post-merger
equilibrium is described by the following values of total production and
price,
Qm =
(n− 1) (a− c) + ∆c
nb
Pm =
a+ (n− 1) c−∆c
n
of the merged firm’s production and profit,
qmm =
a− c+ (n− 1) ∆c
nb
pimm =
[(a− c) + (n− 1) ∆c]2
bn2
of the outsiders’ production and profit,10
qmo =
a− c−∆c
nb
pimo =
[(a− c)−∆c]2
bn2
of consumer surplus
CSm =
1
2
[(n− 1) (a− c) + ∆c]2
bn2
and total welfare
Wm =
(
n2 − 1) (a− c)2 + 2 (n− 1) (a− c) ∆c+ (2n2 − 2n− 1)∆c2
2bn2
Comparing the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium welfare, the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 In a Cournot industry with linear demand, linear cost
and n symmetric firms, a two-firm merger is welfare improving if and
only if it achieves a reduction in cost such that
∆c
c
≥ γ (n) P
∗ − c
c
(3)
10As common in the literature we denote as outsiders the firms that are not involved
in the merger.
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where γ (n) is a decreasing function that depends only on n with 0 <
γ (n) < 1 and P
∗−c
c is the markup-to-cost (MC) ratio at the pre-merger
equilibrium. Then, the efficiency gains needed to offset the negative
allocative effect of a price increase is an increasing function of the initial
MC ratio.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result can be interpreted as a support to the common wisdom
that the larger the market power of the firms, the greater the alloca-
tive efficiency cost of a merger. Then, the efficiency gains needed to
offset this negative allocative effect should increase with the pre-merger
market power.
In order to compare this equilibrium analysis with Williamson’s re-
sults, we can rearrange condition (3), and express the efficiency gains
needed to keep the welfare constant as a function of the price increase
and of the elasticity at the pre-merger equilibrium.
The results are summarized in Table 2.1.11
η(
∆P
P
)
2 1 0.5
5% 4.64% 5.33% 6.37%
10% a 11.86% 15.76%
20% a a 53,24%
30% a a b
Table 3: Percentage cost reduction needed to offset some given price in-
creases for selected values of η; equilibrium analysis in a linear Cournot
model.
aIt is impossible to have this price increase with this value of elasticity at the
pre-merger equilibrium.
bTo offset this price increase the cost reduction should be larger than 100%.
The difference with Williamson’s results is striking and has two main
11This analysis is carried out treating n as a continuous variable in order to choose
given values of the elasticity of the demand and given price increases due to the
merger. See Appendix for computational details.
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explanations previously highlighted. On the one hand his analysis does
not take into account the presence of a markup in the industry, so
that the allocative efficiency cost of a price-increasing merger is a loss
in consumer’s surplus, only. On the other hand the cost reduction in
Williamson (1968) is computed on the whole production of the industry.
3 Comparative statics in linear Cournot mod-
els
The results in the previous Section highlight how large the efficiency
gains should be in order to offset the negative welfare effect of a price-
increasing merger, and how optimistic Williamson’s analysis is. Treat-
ing n as a discrete variable, it is possible to compute the efficiency
gains needed to keep the welfare constant and the resulting equilibrium
change in price when two firms merge. Table 4 shows this results for
selected values of the elasticity and of the number of symmetric firms
in the pre-merger equilibrium.
nab
ηc 2 3 4 5
0.20
0.33 50.14(15.62 ) 21.28(10.30 )
0.50 40.88(17.68 ) 16.71(10.41 ) 9.46(6.87 )
0.67 79.80(27.53 ) 20.44(13.26 ) 10.03(7.81 ) 6.08(5.15 )
1.00 26.60(18.35 ) 10.22(8.84 ) 5.57(5.21 ) 3.55(3.43 )
1.50 13.30(12.23 ) 5.84(5.89 ) 3.34(3.47 ) 2.18(2.29 )
2.00 8.87(9.18 ) 4.09(4.42 ) 2.39(2.60 ) 1.58(1.72 )
γ (n)d 26.60 20.44 16.71 14.19
Table 4: Percentage cost reduction needed for a 2 firm merger to keep
welfare constant for different values of η and n.
anumber of firms at the pre-merger equilibrium
bin brackets the corresponding price increase, in percentage
cthe elasticity of demand at the pre-merger equilibrium, in absolute value
defficiency gains, as a proportion of the initial MC ratio, needed to keep the
welfare constant
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Some comments can be made. First of all, the cost reduction needed
to keep the welfare constant is inversely related to the elasticity, as in
Table 2.1. This is due to the fact that, in the linear Cournot setting,
the elasticity of the demand is increasing in the equilibrium price; and
the latter, in turn, is increasing in the marginal cost. But the MC ratio
at equilibrium is decreasing in cost; so, a larger elasticity at equilib-
rium is associated with a lower ratio. Given that the efficiency gains
needed to offset the allocative efficiency cost of the price increase are di-
rectly related to the MC ratio, they are inversely related to the demand
elasticity at the pre-merger equilibrium.
A similar argument can explain the inverse relation between effi-
ciency gains and the number of firms. In fact, the more competitive the
market, the lower the allocative efficiency cost of a merger, the smaller
the efficiency gains needed to keep the welfare constant.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the efficiency gains must always
be larger than the price increase (except for very high values of the
elasticity) in order to avoid a reduction in welfare. This is the most
evident contrast between our results and Williamson (1968)’s.
As highlighted in the Introduction, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) pro-
vide conditions under which a profitable merger is welfare enhancing
when firms compete a` la Cournot. These conditions essentially affirm
that a merger, in order to be profitable, should entail reductions in
cost. When the market share of the firms involved in the merger is
below some threshold, these efficiency gains imply that the merger in-
creases the welfare. To illustrate the forces underlying this result we
provide an illustration in the linear framework.
The first step is to analyze merger profitability. Considering a two
firm merger, it is profitable if pimm ≥ 2pi∗i . Salant et al. (1983) show that
a merger in a linear Cournot setting with constant marginal cost and
no fixed cost is not profitable if it does not achieve any cost reduction.
In the following Proposition the magnitude of these efficiency gains is
defined.
Proposition 2 In a Cournot industry with linear demand, linear cost
and n symmetric firms, a two firm merger is profitable if and only if it
achieves a reduction in cost so that
∆c
c
≥ φ (n) P
∗ − c
c
(4)
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where φ (n) is an increasing function that depends only on n. Compar-
ing the two thresholds for profitable and welfare improving merger
φ (n) ≥ γ (n) ∀n ≥ 1
2
(
3 +
√
2 +
√
7
)
' 3.53 (5)
Proof. See Appendix.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) find a sufficient condition for a profitable
merger to be welfare improving: the sum of the market share of the
merging firms must be at most half of the market.12 In the follow-
ing Corollary, using the result (5) in Proposition 2, we define a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the simple linear symmetrical Cournot
oligopoly.
Corollary 1 In a Cournot industry with linear demand, linear cost and
n symmetric firms, a necessary and sufficient condition for a profitable
merger to be always welfare improving is that the sum of the market
shares of the merging firms is lower than 4
3+
√
2+
√
7
' 0.57.
An important feature of Corollary 1 is that it holds even when
the merger reduces price, while Farrell and Shapiro sufficient condi-
tion holds only when the price increases. This is due to the fact that
their results are based on the analysis of the “external effect” of the
merger, that is the sum of the effects on consumer surplus and out-
siders’ profits. Using some properties of Cournot competition they are
able to sign this external effect under general conditions; but only when
the price increases they are able to define the overall effect on welfare.
In section 4 these properties of Cournot competition are presented and
discussed in a more general setting.
The threshold for a merger to be consumer surplus increasing can
be computed. Comparing the prices (or, alternatively, the consumer
surplus) defined in Section 2.1 before and after the merger, the following
Proposition holds:
Proposition 3 In a linear Cournot model, a two firm merger is con-
sumer surplus improving if it achieves a cost saving
∆c
c
≥ P
∗ − c
c
12In this case of linear demand and constant marginal cost.
12
that is, efficiency gains should be at least equal to the pre-merger MC
ratio.
Proof. See Appendix.13
Table 5 compares the different cost reduction thresholds needed to
keep the welfare constant, to have a just profitable merger and to keep
the consumer surplus at the pre-merger equilibrium.
Some comments can be made. First of all, a merger for monopoly,
when n = 2, is profitable even if it does not achieves efficiency gains.
Negative values means that even worsening efficiency the merger is prof-
itable. Second, as shown in Corollary 1, merger profitability implies
welfare improvement for n > 3. In fact, looking at the values of γ (n)
and φ (n), this result is due to the fact the efficiency gains needed for
a profitable merger increases as n increases, while the reduction in cost
needed to have a welfare improvement is decreasing in n.
Third, the condition for profitability is worth discussing. Salant et
al. (1983) pointed out that, as the number of firms increases, it becomes
more difficult for a merger to be profitable. This result does not hold
if we define this difficulty in terms of the necessary cost savings. In
fact, recalling condition (4), ∆cc depends on φ (n) and on the MC ratio.
While φ (n) is increasing in n, the MC ratio is decreasing in the same
variable; so, the efficiency gains needed to have a profitable merger is
the result of these two opposite forces. Table 5 shows that it is first
increasing than decreasing when n > 5.
Forth, the efficiency gains needed to keep the consumer surplus con-
stant is always equal to the pre-merger MC ratio. Then, profitability
never implies a reduction in price.
Finally this table allows us to understand the underlying forces that
drive the Farrell and Shapiro (1990)’s result. For n > 3 (see for example
the values for n = 5) welfare can increase even when the efficiency gains
are not large enough to have profitability of the merger and consumer
surplus improvement. This means that the (positive) effect on outsiders’
profit is larger than the (negative) effect on consumer surplus.
This in turn means that, in the Cournot setting, when the sum of the
merging firms’ market shares is less than the half of the market (n > 4),
13Note that this result holds in the general Cournot setting, as shown in Proposi-
tion 6.
13
na
ηb 2 3
welfarec pi CS welfarec pi CS
0.5 d d d 40.88 (17.68 ) 24.26 e
1.00 26.60 (18.35 ) -17.16 100 10.22 (8.84 ) 6.07 50.00
1.50 13.30 (12.23 ) -8.58 50.00 5.84 (5.89 ) 3.47 28.57
2.00 8.87 (9.18 ) -5.72 33.33 4.09 (4.42 ) 2.43 20.00
γ (n)f 26.60 20.44
φ (n)f −17.16 12.13
na
ηb 5 10
welfarec pi CS welfarec pi CS
0.5 9.46 (6.87 ) 17.85 66.67 2.05 (1.84 ) 8.73 25.00
1.00 3.55 (3.43 ) 6.69 25.00 0.91 (0.92 ) 3.88 11.11
1.50 2.18 (2.29 ) 4.12 15.38 0.58 (0.61 ) 2.49 7.14
2.00 1.58 (1.72 ) 2.98 11.11 0.43 (0.46 ) 1.84 5.26
γ (n)f 14.19 8.18
φ (n)f 26.77 34.91
Table 5: Percentage cost reduction needed for a 2 firm merger to keep
welfare, insiders’ profit and consumer surplus constant for different val-
ues of η and n.
anumber of firms at the pre-merger equilibrium
bthe elasticity of demand at the pre-merger equilibrium
cin brackets the corresponding price increase
dthere is no pre-merger equilibrium at this level of elasticity
ecost reduction needed is higher than 100%
fas percentage of the initial MC ratio
14
the consumer surplus effect is dominated by the outsiders’ profit effect.
In the next Section we will see that this relation is true in the general
Cournot setting and is reversed when the market share of the merging
firms is above the threshold.
4 The external effect of a merger in a general
Cournot setting
Assume that an industry, in which firms produce a homogeneous good
and compete choosing quantity levels, can be described by an inverse
demand function P (Q) with P ′ (Q) < 0, and each firm’s cost structure
is described by the function ci (qi).
We define the reaction functions of the firms in the standard way
ri (qi) , arg max
qi≥0
pii (qi, q−i) ∀i = 1, ..., n
where pii and qi are profit and quantity of firm i, and q−i is the quantity
produced by all the other firms. To have the usual downward sloping
reaction functions it is sufficient to assume that:14
∂2pii (qi, q−i)
∂qi∂q−i
< 0
Expressing this condition in terms of the primitives:
P ′ (Q) + qiP ′′ (Q) < 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n.
This condition for all the firms is respected if we assume that the de-
mand function is such that
P ′ (x) + xP ′′ (x) < 0. (6)
Moreover, to have uniqueness of the equilibrium, assume that
P ′ (Q)− c′′i (qi) < 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n. (7)
14This is the condition to have a submodular game, that is a game with strategic
substitutes. For more on submodularity of Cournot games see Amir (1996).
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Assumptions (6) and (7) imply that the reaction functions are decreas-
ing contractions; that is, their slopes
r′i (q−i) = −
P ′ (qi + q−i) + qiP ′′ (qi + q−i)
2P ′ (qi + q−i) + qiP ′′ (qi + q−i)− c′′i (qi)
(8)
belongs to the interval (−1, 0). This is a sufficient condition to have
uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium.
In the equilibrium each firm’s maximization program implies that:
P (Q) + q∗i P
′ (Q)− c′i (q∗i ) = 0 ∀q∗i > 0 and i = 1, ..., n. (9)
where q∗i is the best response to the quantity produced in equilibrium
by the others.
In what follows we will use a marginal approach to analyze the effect
of a discrete exogenous variation of the rivals output. This approach,
used also by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), is originally due to Gaudet and
Salant (1988).
Starting from the equilibrium, suppose that the quantity produced
by some firms has an exogenous variation. This variation can occur be-
cause some firms act differently with respect to a Cournot player as well
as some firms experience efficiency gains that reduce their production
costs: a merger with efficiency gains could be one of the causes of this
exogenous variation of the output.
The equilibrium responses of the other firms and the overall effect
on market performance are analyzed. Note that the resulting situation
is a Cournot equilibrium for the outsiders and the one (those) that
causes the change can either be in a Cournot equilibrium or not. So,
the following analysis applies to Cournot market, but also to cases in
which some firms act differently.15
With a little abuse of notation, we can define the optimal response
of firm i to an infinitesimal exogenous change of the quantity produced
by the other firms in the following way:
dq∗i = r
′
i (q−i) dq−i
15For example it can be used to analyze mixed oligopoly where there is a public
firm competing with private firms and the effect of a privatization.
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Adding on both sides r′i (q−i) dqi, we can express the variation of the
quantity of the firm i in terms of total output variation:(
1 + r′i (q−i)
)
dq∗i = r
′
i (q−i) (dq−i + dq
∗
i )
dq∗i =
r′i (q−i)
1 + r′i (q−i)
dQ (10)
Equation (10) identifies the equilibrium response of firm i to a total
output change dQ caused by a change in production of some firm. This
analysis is clearly a marginal analysis but, under some regularity con-
ditions, it can be extended to discrete variations, as we will see soon.
By assumptions (6) and (7) the variation of each firm i’s output is
inversely related to the total output variation. Indeed, defining
R′i (q−i) ,
r′i (q−i)
1 + r′i (q−i)
(11)
it has negative sign because
R′i (q−i) = −
P ′ (Q) + qiP ′′ (Q)
P ′ (Q)− c′′i (qi)
< 0
This result is important to show some properties of the Cournot com-
petition.
Proposition 4 The effect of an exogenous variation of the output of
some firms on the equilibrium profit of the others is opposite to the effect
on consumers. In fact, if some firms increase the output exogenously,
total output increases, and price and the other firms’ profit decreases. If
these firms reduce the output, price increases and the other firms’ profit
increases, too.
Proof. The fact that an exogenous variation of the output of some
firms changes the equilibrium output in the same direction is due to
reaction functions being contractions. Indeed, assuming that the output
of some firms j changes for exogenous reasons (for example a change
in her cost function or a change in the objective), summing up the
variation of all the firms but j∑
i 6=j
dq∗i = dq−j =
∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i) dQ
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Adding dqj on both sides
dQ =
∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i) dQ+ dqj1−∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i)
 dQ = dqj
dQ =
1
1−∑i 6=j R′i (q−i)dqj (12)
Since R′i is always negative for every firm, dQ has always the same sign
of dqj even if it is smaller; so, if firm j increases the output, at the
new equilibrium Q is larger and price is lower. The consumers are then
better off.
To see the effect on the other firms’ equilibrium profit of a change in
total output due to a change of the output of some firms j
pi∗i = P (Q) q
∗
i − ci (q∗i )
dpi∗i
dQ
= P ′ (Q) q∗i + P (Q)
dq∗i
dQ
− c′ (q∗i )
dq∗i
dQ
= P ′ (Q) q∗i +
[
P (Q)− c′ (qi)
] dq∗i
dQ
From the first order condition (9), P (Q)− c (q∗i ) = −P ′ (Q) q∗i . Substi-
tuting it in the previous expression and by equation (10) and definition
(11), we have that:
dpi∗i = P
′ (Q) q∗i
(
1−R′i (q−i)
)
dQ (13)
By equation (12) dQ = 1
1−∑i 6=j R′i(q−i)dqj and so:
dpi∗i
dqj
=
1−R′i (q−i)
1−∑i 6=j R′i (q−i)P ′ (Q) q∗i < 0
Moreover this condition always holds for any change in Q and we can
extend the result to discrete variation of quantity, which completes the
proof.
This result can easily be applied to mergers with or without efficiency
gains. Consider now j to be the subset of firms that merge and assume
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that the merged entity acts as Cournot player: if it achieves efficiency
gains such that it produces more than the sum of pre-merger output of
firms j, then total output increases.16 In this case consumers are better
off and outsiders are worse off. On the other hand, if there is no cost
saving, or it is not large enough, the merged firm produces less than pre-
merger output, then total output decreases. The consumers are worse
off while the outsiders are better off. These results are summarized in
the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 Under assumptions (6) and (7), if a merger is harmful
for consumers, it increases outsiders’ profits; if a merger reduces the
price, it reduces the outsiders’ profits.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) use the sum of the effect on consumer sur-
plus and outsiders’ profits to define the external effect of an exogenous
change in the production of some firms. They find conditions under
which this effect is positive when the total output shrinks. In what fol-
lows, we characterize this external effect for a general variation of the
output, both positive and negative. This allows us to extend and fully
characterize the result, that is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that P ′′, P ′′′, c′′i (.) are nonnegative and c
′′′
i (.)
is nonpositive in the relevant range. Suppose that an exogenous varia-
tion of the output of some firms j occurs. Then, the external effect has
always opposite sign to the effect on consumer surplus when the output
of the insiders is smaller than a certain threshold q˜j. When the market
share of the insiders is larger, the external effect has the same sign as
the consumer surplus effect. In the first case the effect on outsiders’
profits dominates the effect on consumer surplus. The reverse is true
in the latter case.
Proof. Total welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and
16In the Cournot setting if a firm has lower cost produces more. See an interesting
application of this result in Salant and Shaffer (1999).
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profits, that is
W =
∫ Q
0
[P (z)− P (Q)] dz + pij +
∑
i 6=j
pii
=
∫ Q
0
P (z) dz −QP (Q) + pij +
∑
i 6=j
pii
where, as usual, j represent the insiders – firms that experience an
exogenous variation of the output – and i 6= j the outsiders.
Now we want to compute the marginal effect on welfare of a marginal
equilibrium change in Q due to the exogenous change in qj ; that is, the
effect on welfare when the outsiders optimally respond to the variation
in the output of the subset of firms j.
dW
dQ
= P (Q)− P (Q) +QP ′ (Q) + dpij
dQ
+
∑
i 6=j
dpi∗i
dQ
=
dpij
dQ
+QP ′ (Q) +
∑
i 6=j
dpi∗i
dQ
Since it is not possible to determine dpijdQ without knowing the reasons
of the change in the output, we can define the external effect as the
difference between the effect on welfare and the effect on insider profits.
From equation (13), we can substitute dpi
∗
i
dQ :
dW
dQ
− dpij
dQ
= QP ′ (Q) +
∑
i 6=j
P ′ (Q) q∗i
(
1−R′i (q−i)
)
dW
dQ
− dpij
dQ
= QP ′ (Q) + P ′ (Q)
∑
i 6=j
q∗i − P ′ (Q)
∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i) q
∗
i
Since
∑
i 6=j q
∗
i = Q− qj
dW
dQ
− dpij
dQ
= −qjP ′ (Q)− P ′ (Q)
∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i) q
∗
i
dW − dpij = −P ′ (Q)
qj +∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i) q
∗
i
 dQ (14)
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So, the external effect has opposite sign with respect to the equilibrium
variation of Q when qj +∑
i 6=j
R′i (q−i) q
∗
i
 < 0
that is, being R′i (q−i) always negative,
qj < q˜j ,
∑
i 6=j
−R′i (q−i) q∗i (15)
The external effect has the same sign when the opposite is true.
By Proposition 4, the sign of dQ is the same as the consumer surplus,
and outsider’s profits move always in the opposite direction. When
condition (15) is true, the effect on outsiders’ profits dominates the effect
on consumers, while consumer surplus effect dominates if condition (15)
does not hold.
To extend this result to discrete changes of the insiders’ output,
conditions on second and third derivatives of inverse demand and cost
functions are needed.17
The most important assumption of the previous Proposition is that
cost functions should be convex for all the firms. However, this is not
a great limitation since concave costs give usually rise to natural mo-
nopolies.18 To better understand the meaning of this threshold, some
examples may be useful. Under linear cost and demand, R′i (q−i) = −1
so q˜j =
∑
i 6=j q
∗
i . This means that half of the market is the thresh-
old. In case of linear demand and quadratic costs it can be shown that
R′i (q−i) = − qiη where η is the elasticity of the demand at the pre-merger
equilibrium.19 So the threshold is q˜j = 1η
∑
i 6=j q
∗2
i .
17See Farrell and Shapiro (1990, p. 116).
18However this is not always true. Even when costs are concave (but not too much)
it can exists a unique equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly with all firms producing. This
is actually a different definition of natural monopoly and it turns out to depend on
the demand function, too. The condition under which this equilibrium exists is
condition (7) for which c′′ can be negative but bigger than P ′. See on this Amir
(2005).
19See Farrell and Shapiro (1990, p. 118) for this result.
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In terms of antitrust policy prescriptions, Farrell and Shapiro affirm
that mergers between firms whose market share is lower than the thresh-
old should be allowed because the external effect is positive. Looking
at the external effect of a merger is then their guideline for antitrust
scrutiny.
However, their result holds only when consumers end up paying
higher price. Indeed:
Corollary 3 Under the conditions of Proposition 5, if a merger be-
tween some firms whose market shares qj < q˜j reduces the price, the
external effect of the merger is negative as long as the output increase
is not too large.
To see this result,note that by (12) we can define the external effect
in terms of qj . From equation (14)
dW − dpij = −P ′ (Q)
qj +
∑
i 6=j R
′
i (q−i) q
∗
i
1−∑i 6=j R′i (q−i) dqj
So W − pij , that can be defined as the external surplus, is decreasing
when qj < q˜j and increasing when qj > q˜j .
Under the conditions of Proposition 5, we graph in Figure 2 this
external surplus as a function of the level of the output of insiders. We
can see that when qj < q˜j and the merger determines an increase in
the output, so that total output increases and consumers are better off,
the external effect is undetermined since it can end up with a quantity
higher than q˜j . But if qj is small enough, so that the post-merger output
cannot be larger than the threshold, we have the paradoxical effect that
the external effect is negative even when welfare increases. To get the
intuition, suppose that the merged firm produces just the same quantity
as the merging firms in the pre-merger situation. It is possible only if
it achieves efficiency gains. So, social gross benefit is unchanged, total
production costs are lower and total welfare increases. The larger the
efficiency gains, the larger the increase in production, the larger the
increase in welfare.
This result of course undermines the validity of the Farrell and
Shapiro (1990)’s policy prescription for which the external effect is the
key element.
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Figure 2: External surplus as a function of insiders’ output.
However, using the relation between external surplus and the level
of production we can extend the analysis to the case when qj > q˜j .
Corollary 4 Under the conditions of Proposition 5, if a merger be-
tween some firms whose market shares qj > q˜j reduces the price, the
external effect of the merger is positive.
The last comment is devoted to the shape of the external surplus.
Given that, when qj increases, price decreases and consumers are better
off, the threshold q˜j defines the relationship between consumer surplus
and outsiders’ profits effects. When qj > q˜j the effect on consumers sur-
plus dominates, while outsiders’ profit effect dominates if qj < q˜j . Then,
Farrell and Shapiro policy prescription holds only when consumers are
worse off; so, if antitrust authorities are more concerned about consumer
protection, their analysis is not of great help.
In the following Proposition we define a very general condition on
the efficiency gains that are sufficient to avoid a reduction in consumer
surplus.
Assume that m < n firms merge and denote by J the set of these
firms, q∗J the sum of their quantities, and c¯
′ their average marginal cost
at the pre-merger equilibrium.
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Proposition 6 Assuming nondecreasing marginal costs, a merger does
not rise the market price if and only if it achieves a reduction in cost,
computed at q∗J , equal to (m− 1) times the pre-merger average MC ratio
of the merging firms.
Proof. Since by equation (12) in the proof of Proposition 4 the
effect on total output has the same sign of the variation of the quantity
of the insiders, all we need is to sign the change in production of the
merging firm. By the first order condition of the new firm M ,
P (QM )− P ′(QM )qM − c′M (qM ) = 0
where QM and qM are the total output and the production of M in
the post-merger equilibrium. Denoting with Q∗ total output in the
pre-merger situation, firm M will produce more than q∗J if and only if
P (Q∗)− P ′(Q∗)q∗J − c′M (q∗J) > 0 (16)
Summing up the first order condition of the insiders in the pre-merger
equilibrium
P ′(Q∗)q∗J =
∑
i∈J
[
P (Q∗)− c′i (q∗i )
]
= m
[
P (Q∗)− c¯′]
where m is the number of merging firms. Then, substituting in (16)
P (Q∗)−m [P (Q∗)− c¯′]− c′M (q∗J) ≥ 0
or
c¯′ − c′M (q∗J)
c¯′
> (m− 1) P (Q
∗)− c¯′
c¯′
that completes the proof.
5 Conclusion
Williamson’s results are not robust to an equilibrium analysis in a
Cournot context. Efficiency gains needed to offset large price increase
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due to a merger are very large and, generally, larger than the price in-
crease. His conclusion on the relevance of the efficiency gains in merger
scrutiny may be misleading if applied to cases of mergers in oligopoly.
In fact, give that cost savings are computed on the whole production of
the industry, it is only adequate to cases of mergers for monopoly.20
Our equilibrium analysis highlights the different and contrasting in-
terests of the parties involved by a change in industry structure: out-
siders are worse off when the efficiency gains of the merger are so large
that the price decreases and the consumers are better off, and, vice
versa, consumers are adversely affected by a merger when outsiders’
profits increase.
This work is about efficiency defense in the merger scrutiny and
takes into account the effect of mergers on the different parties. We
have shown how the effect on consumer surplus is essentially dominated
by the effect on outsiders’ profits of a merger when the merging firms’
market share is not so large. The external effect proposed by Farrell and
Shapiro as a policy instrument in merger analysis, has, in this cases, is
positive only when consumers are worse off. This seems an argument
to disregard their policy prescriptions when antitrust authorities are
concerned about consumer protection.
In terms of consumer surplus improving merger we provide a general
condition under Cournot competition for which a merger is not harmful
for consumers. But it requires very high levels of efficiency gains. As
a result, efficiency defense becomes a weak argument when antitrust
authorities are “consumers-oriented”.
A last remark on fixed costs. We have chosen not to consider them
explicitly in the analysis since the results are not affected by them. In
fact, if they can be considered sunk, then a merger does not achieve
any saving on them. If they are assets that the new merged firm can
combine in order to reduce marginal cost, then the analysis carried out
in the general Cournot framework of Section 4 clearly applies. If the
merger achieves savings on fixed costs, the overall welfare effect of the
merger increases, but the analysis on external effect, outsiders profits
and consumer surplus is not affected at all.
20Recall, however, that he assumes also competitive prices in the pre-merger situ-
ation.
25
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. To define when a two merger increases total
welfare, consumer surplus and profit in the pre-merger and post-merger
situation are compared. The difference in consumer surplus is:
∆CS = CSm − CS∗ = 1
2
[(n− 1) (a− c) + ∆c]2
bn2
− 1
2
n2 (a− c)2
b (n+ 1)2
that reduces to the following polynomial expression in terms of ∆c and
(a− c):
∆CS =
(n+ 1)2 ∆c2 + 2 (n+ 1)2 (n− 1) (a− c) ∆c− (2n2 − 1) (a− c)2
2bn2 (n+ 1)2
(17)
The difference in profits is given by the difference for the merging firms
and for the outsiders. The expression for the former is given by
∆pim = pimm − 2pi∗i =
[(a− c) + (n− 1) ∆c]2
bn2
− 2 (a− c)
2
b (n+ 1)2
Reducing it in the same polynomial form of (17) we obtain:
∆pim =
(n− 1)2 (n+ 1)2 ∆c2 + 2 (n+ 1)2 (n− 1) (a− c) ∆c
bn2 (n+ 1)2
+
−
(
n2 − 2n− 1) (a− c)2
bn2 (n+ 1)2
(18)
The difference in profits for all the outsiders is:
(n− 2) ∆pio = (n− 2)
[
[(a− c)−∆c]2
bn2
− (a− c)
2
b (n+ 1)2
]
that reduces to
(n− 2) ∆pio = (n− 2) (n+ 1)
2 ∆c2 − 2 (n− 2) (n+ 1)2 (a− c) ∆c
bn2 (n+ 1)2
+
(n− 2) (2n+ 1) (a− c)2
bn2 (n+ 1)2
(19)
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To have a welfare increasing merger
∆W = ∆CS + ∆pim + (n− 2) ∆pio ≥ 0
Summing up the three polynomial equation and ordering with respect
to the relevant variable ∆c, the welfare change reduces to
∆W =
(n+ 1)2
(
2n2 − 2n− 1)∆c2 + 2 (n+ 1)3 (a− c) ∆c
2bn2 (n+ 1)2
+
− (2n+ 1) (a− c)
2
2bn2 (n+ 1)2
≥ 0 (20)
The denominator is always positive so what matters is the numerator
that is a second degree polynomial in ∆c. The roots are:
∆c1,2 =
− (n+ 1)3 (a− c)
(n+ 1)2 (2n2 − 2n− 1)∓
∓
√
(n+ 1)6 (a− c)2 + (n+ 1)2 (2n2 − 2n− 1) (2n+ 1) (a− c)2
(n+ 1)2 (2n2 − 2n− 1)
Because the solution of inequality (20) calls for values external to the
interval of the roots, the negative root doesn’t matter. The solution
reduces to
∆c ≥ a− c
n+ 1
[
n
√
n2 + 8n+ 4− (n+ 1)2
2n2 − 2n− 1
]
(21)
Computing the MC ratio at the pre-merger equilibrium
P ∗ − c
c
=
a− c
c (n+ 1)
(22)
and defining
γ (n) , n
√
n2 + 8n+ 4− (n+ 1)2
2n2 − 2n− 1
the efficiency gains needed to have a welfare improving merger are then
∆c
c
≥ γ (n) P
∗ − c
c
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Figure 3: γ(n) as a function of the number of firm in the pre-merger
situation. It is the cost saving needed to keep the welfare constant as a
proportion of pre-merger MC ratio.
that completes the proof. Note that γ (0) = 1 and that γ (n) is decreas-
ing but always positive as shown in Figure 3.
Efficiency gains in terms of elasticity, Table 3. Comput-
ing (the absolute value of) the elasticity of demand at the pre-merger
equilibrium
η = − 1
p′
P ∗
Q∗
= −1
b
a+ nc
n+ 1
b (n+ 1)
n (a− c) =
a+ nc
n (a− c)
The MC ratio at the pre-merger equilibrium can be expressed in terms
of elasticity:
P ∗ − c
c
=
a− c
c (n+ 1)
=
1
nη − 1 (23)
In this sense, the elasticity at the pre-merger equilibrium summarizes
the values of the structural parameters of the market. So, the efficiency
gains needed to keep the welfare constant can be rewritten in the fol-
lowing way:
∆c
c
=
γ (n)
nη − 1 (24)
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When a merger implement the cost savings that keeps the welfare con-
stant, the effect on price is defined by the following expression:
∆P
P
=
Pm − P ∗
P ∗
=
[
a+ (n− 1) c−∆c
n
− a+ nc
n+ 1
]
n+ 1
a+ nc
=
a− c− (n+ 1) ∆c
n (a+ nc)
Substituting for the threshold value of ∆c we obtain the price increase
∆P
P
=
(
n (1 + η)
nη − 1 c− c− (n+ 1)
γ (n)
nη − 1c
)
1
n
(
n(1+η)
nη−1 c+ nc
)
=
(n+ 1) (1− γ (n))
nη − 1
1
n
(
nη(n+1)
nη−1
)
=
1− γ (n)
n2η
(25)
Combining equations (24) and (25) we obtain the efficiency gains needed
to keep the welfare constant as a function of the price increase and of
the elasticity:
∆c
c
=
1
nη − 1
(
1− n2η∆P
P
)
(26)
Using this relation and considering n as a continuous variable, we obtain
the results summarized in Table 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. To compute the efficiency gains needed
to have a profitable merger, compare the profits of merging firms before
and after the merger
pimm ≥ 2pi∗i
[(a− c) + (n− 1) ∆c]2
bn2
≥ 2 (a− c)
2
b (n+ 1)2
Being interested only in the positive root of the problem, it is possible
to make the square root of both sides and, simplifying the terms
(n+ 1) (n− 1) ∆c ≥
(√
2n− n− 1
)
(a− c)
∆c ≥ (a− c)
n+ 1
n
(√
2− 1)− 1
n− 1
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Defining
φ (n) ,
n
(√
2− 1)− 1
n− 1
and using the equation (22) for the MC ratio
∆c
c
≥ φ (n) P
∗ − c
c
To compare φ (n) and γ (n)
φ (n) ≥ γ (n)
n
(√
2− 1)− 1
n− 1 ≥
n
√
n2 + 8n+ 4− (n+ 1)2
2n2 − 2n− 1√
2n
(
2n2 − 2n− 1)− n (n2 − n− 1) ≥ n (n− 1)√n2 + 8n+ 4
√
2
(
2n2 − 2n− 1)− (n2 − n− 1) ≥ (n− 1)√n2 + 8n+ 4
After some algebraic manipulations, the unique real and positive solu-
tion is
n ≥ 1
2
(
3 +
√
2 +
√
7
)
' 3.53
In Figure 4 φ (n) and γ (n) are compared.
Proof of Proposition 3. The simplest way to compare consumer
surplus is to compare the price before and after the merger. A merger
increases consumer surplus if
P ∗ ≥ Pm
a+ nc
n+ 1
≥ a+ (n− 1) c−∆c
n
a− c− (n+ 1) ∆c ≤ 0
∆c
c
≥ a− c
n+ 1
=
P ∗ − c
c
where the last equality comes from equation (22).
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